

Message Text

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ACTION ACDA-12

INFO OCT-01 EUR-12 EA-10 ISO-00 ACDE-00 CIAE-00 INR-07

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FM AMEMBASSY VIENNA

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E.O. 11652: N/A

TAGS: PARM, TECH, IAEA, EC

SUBJECT: US/IAEA DISCUSSIONS ON SAFEGUARDS

REF: A) BRUSSELS 14989; B) STATE 254712;

C) BRUSSELS 12286; D) STATE 246329.

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SUMMARY. US TEAM DISCUSSED US VIEWS ON IAEA SAFEGUARDS WITH

IAEA STAFF, INCLUDING ROMETSCH, ON OCTOBER 21 AND 28. US ALSO

REVIEWED RESULTS OF OCTOBER 25 AND 26 DISCUSSIONS WITH

EURATOM. IAEA REVIEWED THE STATUS OF IAEA-EURATOM NEGOTIATIONS.

THE CONCEPT OF RANDOM QUARTERLY VISITS BY IAEA TO VERIFY

SURVEILLANCE TAPES WAS DISCUSSED AND EVALUATED. FOUR ALTERNATIVE

APPROACHES FOR IAA SAFEGUARDS FOR REACTORS (LWR) ARE IDENTIFIED.

MISSION REQUESTS GUIDANCE RE THESE APPROACHES FOR PRESENTING US
POSITION TO IAEA AND FOR DISCUSSIONS WITH USSR MISSION. END SUMMARY.

1. US TEAM (HOUCK, MAHY, PURPLE, RICH, PERCHONOK, JONES)
MET AM OCT 27 WITH THORSTENSEN (HEAD, EURATOM SECTION, IAEA
DEPT OF SAFEGUARDS) AND MEMBERS OF IAEA'S EURATOM NEGOTIATING
TEAM (TOLCHENKOV, BERNAEK, PERRICOS, RAINER) TO HEAR IAEA VIEWS
ON SITUATION AND BACKGROUND. SUBSEQUENT MEETING, PM OCT 27,

INCLUDED AMB STONE, ROMETSCH, PAPADIMETROPOLIS (AIDE TO D.
FISCHER WHO WAS NOT IN VIENNA) AND OTHERS. OCT 28 MEETINGS
INCLUDED ABOVE IAEA PARTICIPANTS PLUS THORNE, PARSICK AND HOUGH.

2. AT OCT 27 PM SESSION US REVIEWED MAIN POINTS OF DISCUSSIONS
ON OCT 25 AND 26 WITH EURATOM AS REPORTED REFTEL A.
A. US MADE FOLLOWING POINTS, NOTING WE HAD ALSO MADE SAME POINTS
WITH EURATOM: US WAS NOT INJECTING ITSELF INTO IAEA-EURATOM
NEGOTIATIONS; WAS NOT ASKING FOR ANY DELAY OR INTERRUPTION
IN NEGOTIATIONS; AND DOES NOT BELIEVE THERE IS ANY NEED FOR
RENEGOTIATION OF THE IAEA-EURATOM SAFEGUARDS AGREEMENT OR ITS PROTOCOL.
IN
RESPONSE TO LAST POINT ROMETSCH NOTED THAT QUOTE
RULES AND METHODS END QUOTE AND EXAMPLES OF FACILITY ATTACHMENTS
WHICH HAD ALSO BEEN NEGOTIATED (IN 1971-1972) WHOLE AGREEMENT
WAS BEING NEGOTIATED WERE FOR THE MOST PART NO
LONGER VALID (E.G. THE ASSUMPTION THAT SEALS
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WOULD BE PACED ON LWR FUEL ASSEMBLIES). FYI.
PARA 12 OF RULES AND METHODS STATES THEY"... REFLECT THE PRESENT
(1971) STATE OF KNOWLEDGE AND EXPERIENCE. THEY SHALL BE REVIEWED
ACCORDING TO ARTICLE 12 OF THE PROTOCOL TO TAKE INTO ACCOUNT
NEW TECHNOLOGICAL DEVELOPMENTS IN THE FIELD OF SAFEGUARDS AND
EXPERIENCE GAINED...."END FYI.
RATHER THAN TRYING TO GO THROUGH THE DIFFICULT PROCESS OF
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RENEGOTIATING THESE DOCUMENTS, THE IAEA IS LEAVING THEM TO
HISTORY AND IS SEEKING TO NEGOTIATE THE ACTUAL FACILITY ATTACHMENTS
DIRECTLY. THIS APPROACH IS REFLECTED IN THE UNDERSTANDING REACHED
WITH EURATOM FOR IAEA SAFEGUARDS AT WAK REPROCESSING PLANT,
I.E. JOINT TEAM APPROACH.
B. US GROUP ALSO POINTED OUT THAT WE HAD NOT QUESTIONED MULTI-
NATIONAL
CHARACTER OF EURATOM OR EFFECTIVENESS OF ITS SAFEGUARDS BUT
WE WERE CONCERNED ABOUT PRECEDENTIAL ASPECT FOR IAEA SAFEGUARDS
IN OTHER NNWS. IN RESPONSE TO ROMETSCH QUESTIONS U.S.
MADE CLEAR WE WERE NOT SAYING NOR HAD WE SAID TO EURATOM,
THAT MULTINATIONAL CHARACTER WAS TO BE TAKEN INTO
ACCOUNT IN IAEA-EURATOM SAFEGUARDS AGREEMENT. ROMETSCH RESPONDED
THAT IAEA DOES NOT TAKE INTO ACCOUNT MULTINATIONAL CHARACTER
OF EURATOM, ONLY TECHNICAL EFFECTIVENESS OF ITS
SYSTEM. HE ALSO CONFIRMED THAT JAPAN-IAEA AGREEMENT AND PROTOCOL
CONTAINED EFFECTIVELY SAME PROVISIONS AND THAT ANY NPT STATE, IF THEY
ESTABLISHED AN EFFECTIVE STATE VERIFICATION SYSTEM, WAS ELIGIBLE
FOR SAME KIND OF SAFEGUARDS AGREEMENT. ROMETSCH ASKED WHETHER
U.S. CONCERNS ABOUT PRECEDENTIAL ASPECTS AROSE FROM THIS LEGAL
SITUATION OR FROM CONCERNS OF IAEA SAFEGUARDS IN EURATOM BEING

A PRECEDENT IN PRACTICE FOR ALL
IAEA SAFEGUARDS. U.S. SAID BOTH WERE OF CONCERN.

3. ON OCT 27 U.S. PROVIDED ROMETSCH WPTH SAME PAPER GIVEN
EURATOM ON QUOTE U.S. VIEWS ON TECHNICAL OBJECTIVES AND GOALS
FOR IAEA SAFEGUARDS END QUOTZ BASED ON REFTEL B. (PAPER BEING SENT
BY AIRGRAM.) ROMETSCH SAID HE WAS GLAD TO RECEIVE U.S. VIEWS,
BUT CAUTIONED THAT THEIR ADOPTION BY IAEA WAS
A MATTER OF OBTAINING CONSENSUS AMOUNG A NUMBER OF STATES. IAEA
STAFF (MOSTLY HOUGH AND PARSICK) HAD SEVERAL QUESTIONS AND
COMMENTS, MOST DEALING WITH DETECTION GOALS AND PARTICULARLY
THESE GOALS FOR SMALL FACILITIES HAVNG LESS THAN ONE EFFECTPVE
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KILOGRAM OF MATERIAL. THEY ALSO NOTED THAT
DETECTION HOALS DEPEND UPON MEASUREMENT
ACCURACY AND SAID THE IAEA URGENTLY
NEEDS ACTUAL U.S. DATA TO SUPPORT HIGH
STATNDARDS FOR ACCOUNTANCY MEASUREMENTS BY OTHER STATES.
U.S. OFFERED TO CONTINUE DISCUSSIONS WITH IAEA ON U.S. PAPER
AND TO EXPLORE JOINTLY HOW VARIOUS OBJECTIVES AND GOALS MIGHT
BE ACHIEVED IN TERMS OF TIME
FRAME FOR THEIR ACHIEVEMENT AND IN TERMS OF RESOURCE AND
TECHNOLOGY DEVELOPMENT REQUIREMENS. MISSION PLANS TO CONTINUE
DISCUSSIONS WITH IAEA ALONG THESE LINES
AND LASO TO PROVIDE EKLUND AND FISCHER WITH U.S. PAPER.

4. IN BRIEF REVIEW OF STATUS OF IAEA-EURATOM NEGOTIATIONS ON FACILIT
Y
ATTACHMENTS, OTHER THAN FOR LWR, ROMETSCH AND THORSTENSEN MADE FOLLOW
ING
POINTS. JOINT REAM APPROACH HAS BEEN AGREED TO FOR WAK
REPROCESSING PLANT, WHEREIN IAEA AND EURATOM INSPECTORS
WILL JOINTLY CARRY OUT INSPECTION ACTIVITES THAT WILL ENABLE EACH
TO DEVELOP ITS OWN INDEPENDENT CONCLUSIONS. CURRENT ESTIMATES ARE
405 IAEA MAN-DAYS PER YEAR FOR WAK AND 610 FOR EQUIVALENT
FACILITY WHERE STWTE IS NOT CARRYING OUT JOINT VERIFICATION. IAEA
STRESSED, HOWEVER, THAT THESE NUMBERS ARE ONLY ESTIMATES FOR
CARRYING OUT THE AGREED INSPECTION

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ACTIVITIES, WHICH WERE WHAT WERE IMPORTANT, AND THE MAN-DAYS
ACTUALLY REQUIRED WOULD DEPEND UPON HOW LONG IT TOOK FACILITY
OPERATOR TO DO CERTAIN THINGS AND HOW LONG VARIOUS INSPECTION
ACTIVITIES TOOK. ACCORDING TO ROMETSCH JOINT TEAM APPROACH HAS
BEEN AGREED TO BY EURATOM FOR ALL SENSITIVE FACILITIES WHICH
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INCLUDE REPROCESSING PLANTS, ENRICHMENT PLANTS, , AND PLUTONIUM
(MIXED-OXIDE) AND HIGHLY ENRICHED URANIUM FABRICATION PLANTS. AGREEMENT

HAS NOT BEEN REACHED ON LOW ENRICHED URANIUM FABRICATION PLANTS.
THESE ARE STILL A PROBLEM WITH THE ISSUES BEING (1) WHETHER
IAEA IS TO ACCEPT EURATOM RESUTS OR CARRY OUT INDEPENDENT VERFIFICATION

AND (2) RATIO OF INSPECTON EFFORT. IAEA POSTITION IS IAEA
MUST DO INDEPENDENT VERIFICATION,MUST CONDUCT RELEVANT INSPECTION
ACTIVITIES AND SHOULD DO SO JOUNTLY WITH EURATOM IN MANNER

SIMILAR TO WAK. THORSTENSEN NOTED THAT BOTH ORGANIZATIONS
WILL HAVE DIFFICULTY VERIFYING
CERTAIN ASPECTS OF PRODUCED FUEL ASSEMBLIES WITHIN PRACTICAL INSPECTION

EFFORT LIMITS AND WITH PRESENT EQUIPMENTS AND THAT, THEREFORE,
BOTH SHOULD COOPERATE IN INSPECTIONS AS MUCH AS POSSIBLE.
ROMETSCH STRESSED IMPORTANCE IN ALL CASES
OF COOPERATIVE RATHER THAN COMPETITIVE APPROACH BY EURATOM
IF SAFEGUARDS ARE TO BE SUCCESSFUL.

5. LWR (LIGHT WATER REACTOR) FACILITY ATTACHMENT ISSUES WERE DISCUSSED

AT LENGTH. A. THORSTENSEN REVIEWED RECENT NEGOTIATIONS.
IAEA'S EURATOM NEGOTIATING TEAM VIEW IS IAEA MUST AS MINIMUM
CONDUCT ONE ANNUAL MAIN INSPECTION DURING REACTOR REFUELLING AND ONE
SURVEILLANCE SYSTEM SERVICE VISIT SIX-MONTHS LATER. THEY ASSERT
TV CAERAS CANNOT OPERATE UNATTENDED FOR A YEAR AND THAT SERVICING,
INCLUDING TAPE REPLACEMENT, CHECKING OPERABILITY AND PREVENTIVE
MAINTENANCE, MUST BE DONE AT SIX-MONTH INTERVALS.
PRIOR TO SEPT 1977 BOARD MEETING ROMETSCH AND FISCHER HAD APPARENTLY
BEEN READY TO ACCEPT A SINGLE ANNUAL IAEA INSPECTION (AND MAY
HAVE INDICATED SO TO EURATOM). IN OUR DISCUSSIONS ROMETSCH STATED VIEW
THAT PAPER APPROVED BY EC COUNCIL OF
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MISISTERS (REFTEL C) IN SEPTEMBER DOES NOT PRECLUDE A SIX-
MONTH CAMERA SERVICE VISIT BY IAEA.

B. CONCEPT OF IAEA OBSERVATION ON RANDOM BASIS
OF QUARTERLY REMOVAL OF SLAVE (I.E. DUPLICATE) SURVEILLANCE
TAPES BY EURATOM WAS DISCUSSED. IAEA INDICATED THAT IF THEY WERE
PRESENT

AT SIX-MONTH INTERVALS REGULARLY TO SEAL CAMERA
HOUSING OF SLAVE TAPE THEN VERIFICATION OF VALIDITY OF SLAVE
TAPES COULD BE ESTABLISHED THREE MONTHS LATER THROUGH SUCH
RANDOM OBSERVATION. DEGREE OF CONFIDENCE WOULD DEPEND
ON NUMBER OF SUCH RANDOM QUARTERLY VISITS. 100 PERCENT CONFIDENCE
WOULD REQUIRE TWO PER YEAR PER REACTOR (PLUS
THE MAIN INSPECTION AND THE SIX-MONTH SERVICING). 50 PERCENT
WOULD REQUIRE AN AVERAGE OF ONE PER REACTOR. EVEN AN AVERAGE OF
SOME BUT LESS THAN ONE PER YEAR PER REACTOR WOULD ESTABLISH
PRINCIPLE OF IAEA DETECTION TIME OF THREE MONTHS. U.S. NOTED
THAT IN DISCUSSIONS WITH EURATOM ON THIS CONCEPT EURATOM HAD
INDICATED WILLINGNESS TO CONSIDER SOME FLEXIBILITY IN HOW
IAEA USED INSPECTION MAN-DAYS.

C. IN RESPONSE TO IAEA QUESTIONS AS TO WHETHER
U.S. WAS CHANGING ITS VIEWS ON LWR SAFEGUARDS, GIVEN PREVIOUSLY
TO IAEA PER REFTEL D, U.S. STATED THAT DETECTION TIME FOR IAEA
OF THREE MONTHS FOR LWR SPENT FUEL WAS ACCEPTABLE TO U.S. ALTHOUGH
WZ PREFERRED AND WOULD CONTINUE ARGUING TWO MONTHS AS THE GOAL.
U.S. REPEATED CONCERN (REFTEL D) ON TECHNICAL FEASIBILITY OF

DEVELOPING EQUIPMENT WHICH COULD PROVIDE ASSURANCE TO IAEA
THAT SLAVE TAPES REMOVED BY OTHERS THAN IAEA WERE VALID. U.S.
STATED VIEWS THAT FACILITY ATTACHMENTS SHOULD NOT BE BASED ON
UNPROVEN TECHNOLOGIES AND SHOULD NOT CONTAIN PROVISIONS WHICH
PREVENT IAEA FROM ACHIEVING GOALS. IN RESPONSE TO ROMETSCH
QUESTIONS AMB STONE STATED U.S. WAS NOT ASKING IAEA TO REOPEN
POSITIONS IN PAPER APPROVED BY EC COUNCIL OF MINISTERS IN SEPTEMBER
BUT TO GET AS MUCH AS POSSIBLE OUT OF THAT

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D. TOLCHENKOV (USSR NTIONAL) OPPOSED THE CONCEPT
OF A FEW RANDOM QUARTERLY INSPECTPONS BY THE IAEA TO VERIFY
TO SLAVE TAPES AND ARGUED THAT THE IAEA MUST BE PRESENT AT
REMOVAL OF ALL TAPES. (HE DID NOT INDICATE WHETHER HE WOULD
AGREE TO THREE INSTEAD OF TWO-MONTH INTERVALS.)

HE ALSO SAID THAT BY SUGGESTING THAT THE AGENCY WORK WITHIN THE EC COUNCIL OF MINISTER'S DECISION, THE U.S. WAS SUPPORTING LIMITED OFFICIAL USE

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EURATOM AND THAT IT SHOULD BE SUPPORTING THE IAEA. THE U.S. GROUP RESPONDED THAT WE BELIEVED THE IAEA COULD ACHIEVE A THREE-MONTH DETECTION TIME, ALTHOUGH WITH A LOWER DETECTION PROBABILITY, WITHIN THE GENERAL FRAME OF THIS DECISION AS WE UNDERSTOOD IT TOGETHER WITH THE FLEXIBILITY INDICATED BY EURATOM ON USE OF MAN-DAYS, AND THAT WE WERE NOT ABANDONING OUR VIEWS (ON TIMELINESS OF DETECTION) GIVEN IN THE U.S. PAPER BUT WOULD CONTINUE PRESSING FOR THEIR ACHIEVEMENT.

6. THE ALTERNATIVES WHICH MIGHT BE PURSUED BY THE IAEA IN NEGOTIATING LWR FACILITY ATTACHMENTS WITH EURATOM CAN BE BRIEFLY STATED AS FOLLOWS.

- A. ONE IAEA INSPECTION PER YEAR WITH SURVEILLANCE BASED ON THE MASTER TAPE REMOVED BY THE IAEA DURING THIS INSPECTION. THIS PROVIDES A ONE-YEAR DETECTION TIME FOR IAEA.
- B. ALTERNATIVE A PLUS CAMERA SERVICE VISIT SIX-MONTHS LATER. THIS PROVIDES A SIX-MONTH DETECTION TIME. IN BOTH A AND B THE IAEA COULD REVIEW IN LUXEMBOURG THE SLAVE TAPES REMOVED QUARTERLY BY EURATOM BUT THE IAEA WOULD NOT BE ABLE TO VERIFY THE VALIDITY OF THE SLAVE TAPES.
- C. ALTERNATIVE B PLUS SOME RANDOM QUARTERLY VISITS TO OBSERVE REMOVAL BY EURATOM OF THE SLAVE TAPES AND PROCEDURES TO CONTROL THESE TAPES UNTIL REVIEWED BY THE IAEA. THIS WOULD PROVIDE A STATISTICALLY VALID BASIS FOR DRAWING CON-

CLUSIONS ON A THREE-MONTH DETECTION TIME ON THE VALIDITY OF ALL SLAVE TAPES BUT THE PROBABILITY OF DRAWING SUCH CONCLUSION WOULD BE LOWER THAN NORMAL.

- D. ONE MAIN INSPECTION DURING REFUELLING AND THREE QUARTERLY CAMERA SERVICE INSPECTIONS. THIS WOULD PROVIDE THREE-MONTH DETECTION TIME WITH THE NORMAL (HIGH) DETECTION PROBABILITY (UNDER ALL ALTERNATIVES WORK WOULD BE UNDERTAKEN ON TAMPER RESISTANT LIMITED OFFICIAL USE

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EQUIPMENT WHICH, IF SUCCESSFULLY DEVELOPED, WOULD PERMIT IAEA TO HAVE CONFIDENCE IN THE VALIDITY OF SLAVE TAPES WITHOUT IAEA PRESENCE DURING ANY OF THE QUARTERLY REMOVAL OF THE SLAVE TAPES.)

7. MISSION REQUESTS GUIDANCE ON WHETHER ALTERNATIVE C IS ACCEPTABLE TO U.S. OR WHETHER TO CONTINUE TO PRESS FOR ALTERNATIVE D ON BASIS OF REFTEL D. RESPONSE IS NEEDED URGENTLY FOR REMOVING

ANY UNCERTAINTY ON PART OF IAEA AS TO U.S. POSITION AND
FOR DISCUSSIONS PLANNED WITH USSR MISSION (SEE SEPTTEL). STONE

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Message Attributes

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